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Abstract: Building on work by Bertrand Gille (1978), Bernard Stiegler argues that waves of 
technological automation tend to be characterised by periods of social ‘disadjustment’, when the 
rapid pace of change leaves political and social support systems inadequate to the task of 
ensuring societal cohesion. In the absence of adequate rules for the government of consumption, 
we can see this technological disadjustment symptomatised in a phenomenon of ‘generalised 
addiction’. We are living through one such period at the moment, struggling in the wake of 
disintegrating older social norms, and prior to the birth of new ones better able to mitigate the 
toxic potential of our technological pharmaka. But emerging work in addiction research facilitates 
the argument, made here, that epidemics of generalised addiction are not unique to the digital 
era. The works of Plato can be interpreted as a response to an addiction epidemic in fifth-century 
Athens, which was attributable, in turn, to the technological revolution of alphabetic writing. The 
comparison of then and now, two periods of technological change bringing political turmoil, throws 
up multiple parallels with the ongoing transformations of digital culture. Athenian symposia 
functioned as sanctuaries where aristocrats, displaced from their traditional position at the heart 
of an increasingly chaotic city, retreated to experiment with religious, poetic and pharmaceutical 
oblivion. They accordingly bring to mind both the anxiety-relieving ‘zones’ of escape and 
disavowal sought out by addicts in using, and the internet echo chambers into which we retreat 
from an increasingly fragmented public sphere. In a move that hints at an exit strategy for our own 
period of generalised addiction, Plato builds on the logical thinking made possible by the new 
technology of writing to reinvent and readjust a dislocated political morality.  
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Automations, Technological and Nervous:  
Addiction Epidemics from Athens to Fake News1 
 
Building on work by Bertrand Gille (1978),2 Bernard Stiegler argues that waves of technological 
automation tend to be characterised by periods of social ‘disadjustment’, when the rapid pace of 
change leaves political and social support systems inadequate to the task of ensuring societal 
cohesion.3 We are living through one such period at the moment, struggling in the wake of 
disintegrating older social norms, and prior to the birth of new ones better able to mitigate the 
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toxic potential of our technological pharmaka. The environmental stresses of neoliberal existence 
combine, to vicious effect, with an economic model of ‘dopamining’,4 in which everything from 
social media and fitness fanaticism, to sugar, gambling, the pharmaceutical industries and even 
religion, compete to hack into and monetise our dopamine systems. As a result, and in the 
absence of adequate rules for the government of consumption, this technological disadjustment 
is symptomatised in a phenomenon of ‘generalised addiction’.5 The expression comes from 
psychologists, analysing proliferating rates of dependence not just on coffee, alcohol and opioids 
(America’s ‘pain epidemic’, linked in turn to the growth of ‘white morbidity’), but also – and perhaps 
above all – digital technologies. There is a burgeoning literature on the automation of cognition, 
which Stiegler, Parisi and Massumi, among others, relate to contemporary technological 
automation and to algorithmic technologies able to exploit the mechanics of our neural circuitry. 
Research in this area describes how experience and cognition are automated by marketing 
techniques, which deploy high-intensity doses of electrical stimulus to tap directly into our baser 
drives and short-circuit rational deliberation. Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi accounts for the recourse to 
online pornography in similar terms, as an ‘attempt at emotional automation’ on the part of users, 
insofar as it prescribes their experience and habituates them to respond only to a certain kind of 
stimulus.6 But these are only one aspect of what we might more expansively term the automation 
of the nervous system, which needs in turn to be situated in relation to the broader, dislocated, 
ecology of contemporary consumption. 
Emerging work in addiction research enables us to see that the epidemic of generalised 
addiction is not unique to the digital era, however. Waves of addiction hitherto dismissable as 
politicised metaphor and hyperbole in fact overlap with major shifts in the technological 
organisation of society across history. They moreover map onto revolutions in philosophy, with 
philosophers like Kant and Plato having been instrumental both in diagnosing the intoxications of 
technology dependence and in reinventing educational norms around the new technical system. 
Chad Wellmon has persuasively shown how Kant formulated critical philosophy in response to 
eighteenth-century fears of book addiction, or the automation of decision in those who delegate 
thinking to their reading material.7 For reasons of space, here we shall focus on Plato, situating 
him at the heart of an addiction epidemic in fifth-century Athens; one that coincides with the 
technological revolution of alphabetic writing. The comparison of then and now, two periods of 
technological change bringing political turmoil, throws up multiple parallels with the ongoing 
transformations of digital culture. Recent diagnoses of disordered internet consumption 
correspond to a softening of earlier, more hardline definitions of addiction as a disease, in favour 
of recognising addiction as a product of the neuroplastic brain being continually reshaped by its 
environments. The discovery that we can be addicted to more or less anything is anticipated in 
Plato’s depictions of Athens during a period when the traditional institutions of oral culture were 
proving increasingly unable to contain the moral-political disruption unleashed by the 
concretisation of Athenian society around writing. An encounter with the intoxicating automations 
of writing becomes his point of departure for seeing the same effects of pathological consumption 
throughout the anxiety-ridden, degenerating culture of the polis. Echoing the Twitter mobs of the 
digital era, writing occasioned demagoguery and trigger happy ostracisms. And its 
transformations fed into the simultaneous decline and growing significance of the symposium, or 
drinking party, explored in Plato’s text of the same name. The parties functioned as sanctuaries 
where aristocrats, displaced from their traditional position at the heart of an increasingly chaotic 
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city, retreated to experiment with religious, poetic and pharmaceutical oblivion. They accordingly 
bring to mind both the anxiety-relieving ‘zones’ of escape and disavowal sought out by addicts in 
using, and the internet echo chambers into which we retreat from an increasingly fragmented 
public sphere, riven by incommensurable, toxic and intoxicating discourses on the concupiscent 
behaviours of our designated enemies. In a move that hints at an exit strategy for our own period 
of generalised addiction, Plato builds on the logical thinking made possible by the new technology 
of writing to reinvent and readjust a dislocated political morality.  
 
The norms of addiction 
 
Not all addictions are deemed pathological, and some are not even recognised as addictions per 
se. The well-established contrast between caffeine and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) illustrates the 
relativism at work in pathologisation. Medical evidence is by no means clear that the former is 
less damaging to health than more illicit narcotics,8 but it is a major global commodity 
underpinning what remains of the post-consumerist high streets of late 24/7 capitalism. While 
marijuana is stereotyped as an indolence-inducing somnolescent, coffee is a stimulatory 
precondition, a pharmacological sine qua non, for adaptation to the long hours of the sleep-
deprived twenty-first-century worker. We know that the neurobiology of love, characterised by 
craving, the narrowing of attention around the beloved, and violent sickness in the event of 
deprivation, is essentially identical to that of addiction. The term even used to be applied 
favourably as an expression of devout Christianity,9 before its positive connotations became lost 
in the passage from the seventeenth to the twenty-first century, via prohibition and the ‘War 
Against Drugs’. Despite neuro-, psycho- and sociological evidence of debilitating attachment to 
our digital devices,10 there is considerable reluctance to classify their behavioural automation as 
amounting to anything more than an unhelpfully hyperbolic ‘metaphor’ that falls short of the ‘strict 
clinical threshold for addiction’.11 But these contestations exaggerate the stringency at work in 
medical diagnoses, which habitually more or less re-project the social norms and schemata of 
acceptability. The long-standing ‘disease model’ of addiction has monopolised images of dissolute 
crackheads at ‘rock bottom’, the ten percent or so of addicts who never go through ‘spontaneous 
remission’, their supposedly fixed brain chemistry having been irreparably ‘hijacked’ by the drug’s 
intrinsically addictogenic properties. But critical discussion has since moved from a focus on an 
explosive interaction between the ‘healthy’ reward (‘dopamine’) system and its corruption by a 
specific subset of pharmaceuticals, to the ecology of consumption and the organism’s ongoing 
adaptations to its environment.12 The emergence of evidence for behavioural phenomena like 
compulsive consumption of exercise, the internet, video games and gambling has gone hand-in-
hand with a loosening of etiological criteria – to the point where some critics have argued for 
‘evacuating the concept of addiction, once and for all’, because of a ‘conceptual landscape so 
rubbled and defeatured’ by politicisation as to render impossible any ‘analytically usable language 
of habit’.13 The Diagnostic of Statistical Medicine has accordingly tended to opt for the more 
deflationary language of ‘substance use and behavioural disorders’, though has recently returned 
to preferring the less ambiguous ‘addiction’, now understood as existing along a continuum of 
severity.14 Aversion to the term stems, in part, from the fear that it can be used to stigmatise and 
exclude, while also immunising those with more socially acceptable bad habits from being tarred 
with the same brush. The changing climate of diagnosis, however, means that we can see 
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addiction as more prevalent than has hitherto been assumed, and only really recognised as 
problematic when practices of consumption no longer cohere with social norms that legitimate it.  
 Perhaps the most decisive influence on the reordering of addiction research is Bruce K. 
Alexander’s theory of ‘psychosocial dislocation’, which presents addiction as a ‘rational’, ‘adaptive’ 
response to community disintegration.15 The idea began life with Alexander’s infamous ‘Rat Park’ 
experiments of the 1970s, which criticised earlier claims about the intrinsic addictiveness of 
opioids by demonstrating that laboratory rats’ impulse to consume drops markedly when they are 
given the freedom to construct for themselves the environments in which drugs are offered up for 
consumption.16 Seemingly toxic levels of abuse, Alexander concluded, are not inherently 
pathological, but the lesser of two evils, namely coping mechanisms for dealing with the 
constrictions of a traumatic environment. As a short-term strategy of adaptation, they become 
particularly prevalent in socially fragmented societies.17 The idea of addiction as an adaptive 
strategy has since been echoed by contemporary neuroscience, which tells us that dopamine is 
a crucial component in the neuroplasticity that enables the brain to adapt itself around the 
dominant sensory cues of an environment. Experiential learning proceeds because we crave the 
repetition of actions that hitherto yielded stimulatory reward. The neuroreceptor causes us to 
‘automatise behaviour’18 in learned response to familiar patterns and the repetition of more or less 
any intense experience can bring about a reorganisation of the brain’s synaptic circuitry. Addiction 
occurs as a side-effect of the ongoing process of reorganisation, taking hold by way of a 
technically ‘positive’, but in practice deleterious, feedback loop that sets in when desensitisation 
combines with neuronal pruning to make attention narrow ever more tightly around a limited 
bandwidth of environmental stimulation.19 This kind of ‘attentional narrowing’ becomes particularly 
acute in environments that offer little in the way of alternative to the high provided by a given 
intoxicant. And it is why the circumstances that push us to consume in the first place become a 
key differential factor in addictogenesis. Industrial automation comes high up the list of 
background causes, on one hand through the destruction of jobs and whole communities, 
identified as a significant factor in America’s ongoing ‘pain epidemic’; on the other, through the 
automation-induced debasement of once-meaningful work into traumatically boring ‘bullshit 
jobs’.20 The reliance on impossible target-setting to keep precarious workers motivated pushes 
them to search for stimulation and anxiolysis elsewhere. Research is establishing a clear link 
between rising levels of addiction and an ecology of labour that occasions multiple causes and 
symptoms of stress, from the paralysis of social mobility to phenomena like ‘white morbidity’, the 
rising mortality of median-income, middle-class workers.21  
 
Addictogenic societies 
 
For Alexander, capitalism’s inability to integrate those it pushes to the margins of society is the 
cause of a widespread epidemic of addiction, which manifests in the pathological abuse of 
everything from conventional drugs to digital technology, food and sport. His argument brings to 
mind Wolfgang Streeck’s description of the fourfold technique of ‘coping, hoping, doping and 
shopping’ as one of the few remaining strategies for surviving the entropic degradation of the 
capitalistic social order.22 A more developed variation on the same idea is found in Bernard 
Stiegler’s account of the ‘generalised addiction’ created by consumer capitalism, which the 
philosopher attributes to the systematic industrial exploitation of the libidinal energies of 
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proletarianised consumers, already running on empty and increasingly dependent on 
pharmacological support to facilitate adaptation to the relentless demands of contemporary 
living.23 A key strand of Stiegler’s argument revolves around the idea that capitalism’s fetishisation 
of consumption has brought about something of a reversal in the social organisation of 
technology, which shifts from curbing the toxicity of technologies to bringing their exploitable 
intoxicating, addictogenic, potential to the fore. The third strand of Stiegler’s theory of ‘general 
organology’ articulates the organisation of society around rules and institutional norms that govern 
our adoption of technology qua ‘pharmakon’, meaning both cure and poison.24 These rules are 
internalised as the rituals and habits that regulate our consumption, their traditional function being 
to mitigate the negative effects of a given technology while facilitating the spread of its positive 
dimension. But the order they create is normative, fragile and undone by the society-wide creation 
of new technological habits, for which regulatory norms have yet to be established. Technological 
change invalidates the existing regulatory norms of adoption, leading to spikes in consumption, 
which are made all the more acute by the technological dislocation and marginalisation of groups 
within society. Unversed in the ways of the new technical system, the marginalised may well lack 
the knowledge and techniques required to limit their use of pharmaka. Goaded to consume by 
industries charged with selling quick-fix technological cures to all manner of social ills, they may 
equally have little interest in doing so. Intoxication in all its forms provides an anxiolytic escape 
route from the traumas of social upheaval – and one whose seductions will only subside with 
society’s readjustment to technological change. Indeed, Stiegler questions whether the function 
of the economics of ‘disruption’ isn’t precisely to prevent the political organisation of society from 
catching up with accelerating technological disadjustment, so as to maintain consumers in a state 
of ‘proletarianised’ dependency, their ‘ways of living replaced by automatism and addiction’.25  
 Writing in its aftermath, Franco Berardi suggested that the financial crisis of 2007-8 was a 
product of ‘the systematic use of euphoria-inducing drugs, including neuro-programming 
substances’ like cocaine and prozac.26 On one level, the outcome was an injection of ‘hyper-
excitation’, short-termist thrill-seeking and, ultimately, depressive lows into the heart of the global 
markets. We can also imagine that impulsification served to automate the decisions of traders, 
allowing them to keep apace with the ever accelerating speeds of automated trading, while 
simultaneously alleviating the anxiety occasioned by responsibility for the vast sums traded. One 
wonders if we should similarly connect another aspect of the prevailing addiction epidemic to 
recent political disruptions of the digital age. If the affair of Cambridge Analytica tells us anything, 
it is that contemporary politics has yet to develop mechanisms for reorganising, or ‘readjusting’, 
the polis around the disruptive technologies that expose as inadequate the regulatory norms of 
the pre-digital social order. Is fake news not symptomatic of a public hooked on media 
consumption, where the short-term buzz-value of digital stimulus outweighs the therapeutic value 
of truth? Mounting concerns over screen and media intoxication are notable for coinciding with 
the resurgence of extremist politics and the breakdown of a communicational model in which the 
media worked to expand the human sensorium, challenge confirmation bias and create a public 
common ground of shared experience around which consensus can be formed. The suspected 
manipulation of voting in both the US presidential elections and the UK’s referendum on Brexit 
was made possible by dopamining techniques like clickbaiting and sponsored newsfeeds offering 
variable dosage hits to feed media junkies a diet of (psychographically tailored) pornographic 
sensationalism, which short-circuit rational deliberation and automate consumers’ thought. As 
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evidence of what Natasha Dow Schüll calls ‘addiction by design’, these techniques work by 
tapping into an anxious, stressed, bored, and underemployed user-base looking online to find 
both stimulation and escapist retreat. One of Schüll’s gambling-addict interlocutors describes the 
space of this withdrawal as the ‘machine zone where nothing else matters’: ‘It’s like being in the 
eye of a storm ... Your vision is clear on the machine in front of you but the whole world is spinning 
around you, and you can’t really hear anything. You aren’t really there – you’re with the machine 
and that’s all you’re with’.27 The description should be familiar to anyone who zones out and stares 
blankly at a screen, loses oneself in a social media black hole, or in self-reinforcing echo 
chambers of righteous indignation, salving one’s wounds with the therapeutic value of being right. 
Away from the frustrations of the world outside, the indulgence and reinforcement of consumers’ 
pre-existing opinions offers a kind of anxiolytic oblivion. Blocking out the chaos of one’s 
surroundings by surrendering to the automation of affect, paradoxically, becomes a way of 
retaining some minimal sense of agency in periods of disadjustment. These periods are 
historically symptomatised in what, with hindsight, we might begin to recognise as addiction 
epidemics, coinciding with changes in the technical system of a society. 
Insofar as capitalism consists in constant technological change, we can arguably read its 
entire history in terms of waves of addiction. The capitalist era was borne of mass cravings for 
sugar and spice in the early modern period, before passing through books – most notably novels 
– and alcohol with the Enlightenment and industrialisation period, then opium and tobacco, as 
physical labour gave way to deskbound bureaucracy and consumerism.28 What marks out the 
present would, above all, be producers’ enhanced knowledge of how to hack and automate the 
nervous system by manufacturing addiction, channelling the search for anxiolytic relief into 
addictogenic products conceived and marketed for that purpose. Stiegler would add that this kind 
of dopamining also coincides with our decreasing ability to harness disruptive technologies in the 
combat against psychosocial dislocation: technological automation locks us out from 
refunctionalising tools for purposes of life-building not envisaged in their deliberately restrictive 
design. But we also find addiction epidemics safely outside the history of capitalism. It is now 
argued both that religious experience strongly implicates the same neural (dopaminergic) 
pathways as more established addictogens,29 and that detrimentally rigid, obsessional, adhesion 
to religious practices should be diagnosed as a behavioural addiction.30 A history of the 
pathological retreat into zones of oblivion relating to the reorganisation of society around religious 
social technologies is surely there to be written. Other epidemics suggest that the socially 
disruptive technology need not necessarily be the principal object of addiction. Writing in The 
Globalization of Addiction (2008), Alexander proposes that ancient Athens was undergoing an 
addiction epidemic at the time of Socrates, as the city struggled to deal with the anomic fallout of 
the Peloponnesian Wars. Evidence for the epidemic is suggested by the Socratic-Platonic 
obsession with weakness of the will. ‘By the end of the Republic’, Alexander argues, ‘Socrates 
has provided a picture of society that is plagued with universal addiction’, indistinguishable from 
the social breakdown that coincides with decimation by war and the ensuing descent towards 
tyranny.31 The entire Socratic philosophical project should accordingly be seen as a response to 
this spate of addiction, advocating systems of government and education adequate to cultivate 
balance between the ‘appetitive’ and ‘rational’ parts of the soul. Others have made similar claims 
and, albeit incidentally, even repeated the juxtaposition of addiction crises in Athens and the 
present. 
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One of these is Alain Badiou, in his self-styled ‘hyper-translation’ of Plato’s Republic, 
undertaken to reassert the work’s contemporaneity. Badiou updates the Platonic language of 
‘appetite’ and ‘enslavement’ to the ‘tyranny’ of the passions with references to ‘pathological 
‘impulses and addictions’ that ‘derive either from the body or from pathological changes in the 
psyche’.32 His reworking of the iconic myth of the cave around the image of a giant ‘cosmic movie 
theatre’ also identifies  technology – albeit a somewhat outdated vision of it – as the cause of our 
entrapment in a world of shadows and simulacra. Plato’s cave-dwellers are recast as audience 
members ‘chained to their seats, with their eyes staring at the screen and their heads held in 
place by rigid headphones covering their ears’.33 Our screens, of course, now tend to be much 
smaller, less physically cosmic than handheld and nomadic. The algorithmic machinations of 
psychographic profilers mean we need not even be watching the same film. And the readiness 
with which we offer ourselves up for technological self-stimulation, with little need for coercion, 
indicates that Badiou’s wording of shackling only half-captures what is at stake in the 
compromised voluntarism of our toxic media consumption. But the ubiquity of screen mediation 
still suggests that Badiou’s metaphor is scarcely metaphorical anymore.  
Less speculatively, Alexander’s reading of Athens also finds support in a work by Michael 
A. Rinella, whose Pharmakon: Plato, Drug Culture, and Identity in Ancient Athens (2010) posits 
that an animus against the ‘frenzy’ of intoxication is the organising principle of a philosophical 
endeavour that responds to the changing landscape of Athenian religion, pharmaceutical 
experimentation, and the chaotic social milieu in which Socrates lived.34 Rinella’s focus on the 
excesses of sympotic culture also enables us to go beyond Alexander, situating the epidemic not 
simply in relation to the fallout of war, but as part of a larger-scale revolution in writing and literacy 
that was transforming all aspects the organisation of Athenian society. Set amidst wide-scale 
technical disadjustment and the eroding authority of the moral and social norms of oral culture, 
Plato’s dialogues converge around a critique of the relationship between tyranny and intoxication 
in all its forms, from alcohol to poetry, music and political rhetoric; there’s even a celebrity 
forerunner to the likes of Trump and Johnson, in the form of the disgraced general in-waiting, 
Alcibiades. All are deemed inferior to an alternative ecstatic experience of truth, namely 
philosophy, which we can accordingly read as a discipline for what Stiegler terms ‘disautomation’.  
 
Drunk on words 
 
Drawing on early research into neuroplasticity and the ability of culture to organise function-shifts 
in the brain, Julian Jaynes speculated of the first (Bronze-Age) writing revolution that it coincided 
with the breakdown of the ‘bicameral mind’. The volitions of the brain’s right hemisphere had, up 
to this point, manifested as audio-hallucinations experienced as the commanding voices of the 
gods. The externalisation of these commands into written orders dimmed the voices, bringing 
them under the internal narrative of a now self-conscious subject.35 Greece subsequently 
regressed to orality, but began to regain literacy in the Homeric era. Athens underwent a sustained 
acceleration in its transition to literate culture over the second half of the fifth century, before the 
city reinvented its organisational norms around ‘full alphabetic dependency ... in the first decades 
of the fourth century’.36 Several groundbreaking works in the anthropology of technology and 
media studies, most notably by Jack Goody, Eric Havelock and Jean-Pierre Vernant, have 
identified this period with the beginnings of the philosophical revolution in Greek thought. They 
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argue that writing served as a vehicle for an abstract, rational, mode of thought and capacity for 
critical distance that would have been much harder to come by under the memorably seductive 
styles of oral poetry. Writing, in this sense, made for a soul experienced as autonomous from the 
passions that had hitherto governed it.37 If so, it might equally have brought to the fore that mental 
state most seemingly antithetical to philosophical detachment. Havelock’s student, Marshall 
McLuhan, questions whether the feeling of dependence we shall see that Plato identifies with 
writing, might have been unavailable to sensorium formed only by oral culture. The Socratic 
‘division of the faculties’ into reason and appetite may have been inspired by an Attic culture 
polarised around two extremes of the austere, disciplined ascesis of the military and the frenzied, 
mystical hubris of the displaced aristocracy.38 But it is equally made possible by what McLuhan 
terms the ‘technological dilation’ of experience into the written, creating a split between what is 
read and what is felt, which places a conflictual divide between reason and appetite at the heart 
of both the subject and society.39 Recent research on the Neanderthal origins of a gene linked to 
higher rates of addiction indicates that the potential for affliction may be older than anatomically 
modern humans,40 while the modern, medicalised concept of addiction emerges only over the 
course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and did not become common until the twentieth. 
But McLuhan’s observation raises the intriguing prospect that it may only have been emerging as 
a phenomenologically distinct experience at around the time of Socrates. A confluence of factors 
including war, several bouts of plague, and society undergoing dramatic technological 
reorganisation, would have contributed to increasingly visible symptoms of psychosocial 
dislocation and disadjustment. 
Plato certainly interweaves the discussion of writing with what we can recognise as 
addiction. Much toner has been spent on the explicit and well-rehearsed discussions of writing in 
the Phaedrus (c.370 BCE), but little heed has been paid to how his analysis grows out of what 
might best be described as a staging of writing’s addictogenic potential. Anticipating Immanuel 
Kant’s later critique of the delegation of thought to books,41 and in a parallel that is frequently 
evoked by technosceptics nostalgic for the end-stage-Holocene art of remembering maps and 
phone numbers, Plato uses the dialogue to criticise the state of naive trust and dependence 
induced by the art of letters. We see Socrates ventriloquise Thamus, the ancient king of Egypt for 
whom the externalisation of memory into written material ‘will introduce forgetfulness into the 
soul’. Famously, writing is described as a ‘pharmakon’, in the sense of being both therapeutic and 
harmful; he goes on to suggest that it is less a tool for truth than a ‘vulgar amusement’, comparable 
to what one finds at ‘drinking parties’ (275a-276e).42 Less remarked upon is how Plato’s arrival at 
this assessment passes through a vision of the pharmakon being liable to induce ‘frenzy’ and 
even death.  
The Phaedrus begins with Socrates accosting the text’s title character as he makes his 
way beyond the walls of the city. He accuses Phaedrus of smuggling in his cloak what transpires 
to be ‘the leaves of a book containing a speech’ by the orator Lysias (228d-230e), which he is 
sneaking off to gorge on in private, away from censorious, suspecting gaze of Athens’s elders. 
The legendarily agorapetal Socrates follows him into the countryside, claiming that the book acts 
as a ‘potion [φάρμακον] to charm me into leaving’ (230d). When Phaedrus agrees to read it aloud, 
the philosopher embarks on a florid meditation on the ecstatic, ‘Bacchic frenzy’ into which he 
roused by its intoxications (234d). He proceeds to theorise the kind of love that is a sickness, 
brought about by the loss of ‘self-control’, which ensues when ‘desire takes command in us and 
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drags us without reason towards pleasure’ (238a). The problem, he diagnoses, is an 
anharmonious relationship between the different parts of the soul, which means that the 
‘surrender to pleasure … without a trace of fear or shame’ can be triggered by any number of 
seductive perturbations (250e-251a), including physical bodies, text, poetry and music. The final 
pages of the dialogue set out a blueprint for what amounts to philosophy as a form of addiction 
therapy, where the philosopher – to borrow a phrase from Bernard Stiegler – would be one who 
‘disautomates’ habit, resisting the seductions of taking something as read, of having the written 
text automate the thinking process (278a-e).43 In line with some twenty-first-century critiques of 
abstinence-based addiction therapy,44 Socrates withholds from prescribing abstention as the 
solution to dependence. Recognising the implausibility of reversion to some equivalent of pre-
digital society, contemporary therapeutic techniques advocate the mitigation of the colonisation 
and narrowing of our synaptic circuitry by digitally-elicited dopamine release. The key to therapy 
is to ‘reinforce alternatives’, by limiting screen-time and broadening our exposure to 
countervailing, including intellectual, stimuli.45 Socrates-Plato takes an analogous route in looking 
to strengthen the faculty of reason, cultivating rational self-discipline as a technique for overriding 
the power of appetitive craving. Their preferred option is to set out conditions in which the curative 
dimension of the pharmakon can flourish, by restricting its role to that of an instrument for living 
in the service of truth. Writing opens up the prospect of a detached rationality because it sets up 
a gap between the eye and the page. The new technology itself provides the basis for new 
curative norms through which readers could adjust to living in the written world. Judging by the 
Phaedrus’s passage from book dependency to the pathological habituations and pursuit of 
ecstasy that we can identify with the twilight of disadjusted, alphabetising, oral society, the 
reflexive mode of thought that writing institutes moreover awakens Socrates to a retreat into 
addiction spreading throughout Athens of the day – and also offers the antidote to it. 
Hitherto neglected, despite considerable attentions paid to the transformation of 
subjectivity by writing, we can identify a fracturing of the Athenian public sphere and withdrawal 
of its members into anxiolytic oblivion as, at least in part, social and political consequences of the 
reorganisation of society by writing. Alphabetisation affected all aspects of society, from 
democracy and foreign policy, to the structures of social class and religion. The rise of an 
emboldened, jingoistic demos saw the once dominant aristocracy drift from the public sphere of 
politics into a private life of mysticism and intoxication. Despite the toxicity that writing  brings with 
it, Plato envisages the disciplined, philosophical thinking that it makes possible as a ‘cure’ 
(φάρμακον, Republic, 595b) and written laws as ‘antidotes’ (ἀλεξιφάρμακα) to the moral ill health 
of the polis (Laws, 959d-e).  
 
The drone in the zone 
 
The roots of Athenian democracy originate with Solon, who, amidst the decline of archaic Athens 
in the sixth century, harnessed the adoption of the then new technology of a written constitution 
to reinvent citizenship around equality before the law. The next phase in the intertwined history of 
democracy and writing enters into play under Cleisthenes, whose system of ostracism allowed 
citizens to stave off tyranny by etching the names of potential threats to the polis into shards of 
pottery. In the face of doubts raised about how far these changes entailed extensive, literacy 
among anyone but elites and lobbyists,46 the latest findings indicate that, over the course of the 
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fifth century, fluency in reading and writing became a prerequisite of citizens’ ability to execute 
the official functions they were allocated by lot.47 Writing thus served as a fundamental instrument 
for the exercise of democracy, and the adoption of the technology by the demos proved mutually 
reinforcing for both, ensuring the spread of literacy across the citizenship. When, at the end of the 
century, a series of aristocratic coups had left the city on the brink of collapse, it was also writing 
that came to its rescue. The revival and reinstitution of the demos in 403 BCE consisted, above 
all, in the transcription of the law onto stone tablets, which by preventing appeal to conveniently 
unwritten laws of oral culture, provided a basis for halting what Plato described as the increasingly 
‘drunken’ behaviours of the Athenian citizenship.  
Much as its facilitation of bookkeeping had made for spectacular growth in trade, however, 
alphabetic disadjustment was also playing a part in the city’s decline, not least by ushering into 
power a mass of citizens all too vulnerable to the poetic seductions of political rhetoric. The 
practice of sophistry had the same effect on the demos as spin and fake news in our present age 
of digital disadjustment, whipping up the masses into a trigger-happy ochlocracy, only too happy 
to dispense mob justice on both fellow citizens – expelling enemies from the city through votes 
cast by carving names into potsherds – and the rest of the Aegean and Mediterranean. The 
intertwining of popular literacy and democracy also fed into the marginalisation of the aristocracy. 
Denied their traditional place in the ‘natural order’, which is to say, at the heart of government 
and, by extension, on the battlefield, the aristocrats stood back from an increasingly fragmented 
public sphere and took refuge in private members clubs, the hetaireiai, arguably more akin to 
gangs of disaffected youths,48 and renowned for their drinking parties, the symposia.49 Where 
they had struggled with the increased publicity of justice and laws, which meant power, once 
mystical and hidden, was now in full view of the city, these parties offered a place to regain a 
sense of mystery and relive the ‘frenzied’ behaviours of their obsolete marshal style,50 via ecstatic 
rituals of intoxication. We can imagine that the scale of social-technical change, compounded by 
the ongoing devastations of wars against Sparta, set Athens in a state of considerable anxiety. 
The clubs functioned as respite, offering oblivion and the degree zero of an alternative to the 
conflict of the demos. They offered a route, perhaps, to the machine zones of their day. 
What we are here interpreting as Plato’s commentaries on a city in the grip of addiction 
home in on the demos and the symposia. Both receive the diagnosis of weakness of the will, or 
‘akrasia’, referring to a form of self-enslavement occasioned by the surrender of agency to the 
baser drives of the soul. Outlined most fully in the Republic, written around 380-360 BCE, this 
diagnosis recurs throughout Plato’s work and pits subservience to corporeal ‘appetite’ and the 
pursuit of pleasure against the rational emancipations of philosophy. His tripartite theory of the 
soul revolves around the opposition between a ‘rational’, calculating part (λογιστικὸν) and the 
‘desiring’, ‘appetitive’ part (ἐπιθυμητικόν). There is also a third, ‘spirited’, or immunological 
component (θυμοειδές), which, in the just body at least, sides with reason in raging against 
disorder (439a-441b). Thumotic spirit is also what means that we cannot simply do without desire 
and the stimulations to which appetite can succumb. The colourlessness of wholesale abstention 
is no basis for learning and should not be confused with moderation of the appetites. Plato aligns 
each part of the soul with one of three – ‘money-making, auxiliary, and deliberative’ – classes of 
the city (441a), and identifies the art of individual self-mastery with that of governing the many. 
For the health of the city to flourish, spirit and, above all, desire, must be subordinate to the rational 
wisdom of philosopher-kings and the requisite training in good noetic order. Such vitality is not to 
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be found in democracy, whose ‘general permissiveness’ and ‘utmost freedom’ to define the good 
in accordance with the whims of its citizens inevitably gives way to the ‘most severe and cruel 
slavery’ of tyranny (563e-564a). Having earlier cautioned against the perils of ‘intoxication’ (μέθη, 
403e), Plato brings his interlocutor, Glaucon, to agree that democracy is the constitution most 
susceptible to it; most liable to creating the tyrannical men who live enslaved to their appetites. 
Indeed, the result of the rule of the mob is that the city itself gets drunk, with perilous 
consequences. ‘When a democratic city, athirst for freedom, happens to get bad cupbearers for 
its leaders, ... it gets drunk by drinking more than it should of the unmixed [ie., undiluted] wine of 
freedom’ (562c-d). As the demos sinks ever further into disorder, ‘bought slaves ... are no less 
free than those who bought them’ (563b). 
Emblematic of democratic cravenness is Plato’s figure of the ‘drone’, a parasitic citizen who 
eats up resources while contributing nothing to the functioning and vitality of the city (552c, 564e-
565c). The metaphor is apian, rather than technological, derived from the stingless bees that 
consume honey while neither pollinating nor participating in the production of honey. But the 
contemporary resonance of drone as automaton is also fitting. Rana Saadi Liebert has shown 
that the identification of poetry and bees originates in archaic Greece’s oral tradition, which makes 
frequent reference to ‘bee-poets producing “honeyed hymns”’ through which to entice the listener. 
The major shift initiated by Plato is to ‘pervert’ this ‘traditional self-presentation’, turning ‘poetic 
tradition against itself’ by reconfiguring the bee as a ‘social parasite’ and ‘sweetness in all its forms 
as a toxin inimical to a healthy state’, ‘addictive’ and ‘corrosive’ in equal measure.51 The metaphor 
recurs throughout the Platonic dialogues, which also deepen the entanglement of poetry, 
democracy and intoxication. The apian ‘drones’ of the Republic become the ‘cicadas’ of the 
roughly contemporaneous Phaedrus, which offers a notoriously vivid account of people who 
became so entranced with the delights of song – so enslaved to the ‘pleasures of the body’ – that 
they stopped eating and drinking and eventually died (258e-259c). There is no reason to think 
these types were confined to the public sphere. On the contrary, drunkenness flourishes in the 
very recesses into which Athenians retreated from the demos. Throwing light on the growing 
drinking culture of ancient Athens in the twilight of its golden age, the earlier Protagoras (pre-387 
BCE) casts poetry and alcohol together as two sides of the same coin. The former is described 
as a feature of ‘the second-rate drinking parties of the agora crowd’, who, ‘unable to entertain 
themselves’ with the quality of their conversation, recourse to paying for ‘flute-girls’, music and 
dancing (347c-d). The parties in question are the symposia, analysed in depth in Plato’s dialogue 
of the same name. Traditionally, these clubs had been sanctuaries of decorum, bastions of 
constraint where men learned the art of disciplined consumption and self-control, forcibly removed 
from the intoxications of democracy. Symposiasts are sometimes still read as lovers of self-
discipline, charged with running educational institutions for the breeding of gentlemen, pushed to 
act against the oblivion of democratic unreason.52 But that view fails to consider how the symposia 
degenerated over the course of the fifth century. As democracy loomed on the horizon, their old 
oral-cultural educational role of preparing young aristocrats for future political and military rule 
was usurped by the emergence of schools teaching literacy, rendering them functionally obsolete. 
Jan Bremmer traces a dramatic generational change to the symposia that overlaps with the 
depoliticisation of the aristocracy. In evidence of what has elsewhere been described as an 
‘intergenerational conflict’ that peaked around 415 BCE,53 older symposiasts were edged out by 
a younger crowd, less respectful and often mocking of the restraint of the outdated moral order of 
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the oral-poetic tradition. The parties became increasingly detached from their pedagogical and 
military roots in shared communal meals, and more obsessed with youth, beauty and the pursuit 
of ecstatic oblivion.54 Hence Plato’s concerns with the entrancing intertwinement of poetry, music 
and alcohol. The combination of the three also appears to reference a form of cultic religious 
practice pertaining to the Eleusinian Mysteries, which was taking hold in Athens, albeit illicitly, on 
the secluded periphery of the polis. Initiation into the highly secretive mysteries involved a 
‘rapturous’ vision of ‘collective terror and then collective relief’, a combination of intoxication, 
theatrical trickery, and possibly also sex, giving rise to an ecstatic experience of divinity.55 Initiates 
were sworn to secrecy on pain of death, but evidence suggests that, ‘in yet another aristocratic 
affront to democracy’s social norms’,56  the sacred rituals were being performed for entertainment 
at private parties, where symposiasts broke religious taboos governing the strict regulation of who 
could prepare ecstacy-inducing intoxicants in pursuit of new intensities of delirium. An informer, 
Andocides, named two men who feature in Plato’s Symposium (c.385-370 BCE), as principal 
culprits deemed guilty of this profanation: Erixymachus and, above all, Alcibiades, the celebrity 
general and adopted son of Pericles.57  
Plato’s critique of the symposiasts’ surrender to automation of the nervous system is on 
view not only in his descriptions of their weak-willed, behaviour, but also in his formulation of 
philosophy as the route to a kind of rational-spiritual ecstasy, to be encountered in the self-
discipline that coincides with the right kind of non-appetitive love. It further comes across in his 
contrasting depiction of Socrates and Alcibiades in the Symposium. As lovers, the two men’s fate 
was inextricably intertwined; the philosopher’s tutelage of the soldier was at the heart of the 
former’s prosecution for ‘corrupting youth’ and disrespecting the gods that culminated in his death 
by hemlock in 399 BCE. Here, however, Plato defends his friend and master with a stark 
illustration of the contrast between Socratic self-discipline and Alcibiades’ hubris. Alcibiades is 
presented as libidinal and outrageously drunk, arriving late to the party with a gaggle of prostitutes 
before lamenting the chastity of Socrates, who refuses all sexual advances and never succumbs 
to intoxication (212d-214a, 219c). Within a year of the dialogue’s setting – widely agreed to be in 
416 BCE, just prior to the failed Athenian conquest of Sicily, and the scandalous ‘mutilation of the 
herms’ that immediately preceded it – the general would be summoned to stand trial not just for 
profanation, but for actions indicating short-termist compulsivity. In 415 BCE, Alcibiades had 
lobbied a triumphalist and somewhat bloodthirsty demos, keen to export the glories of Athenian 
civilisation, to launch – and have him lead – the ultimately catastrophic expedition to Syracuse. 
He subsequently had a change of heart and, it is suspected, became involved in the mutilation of 
Athens’s ‘herms’ in a bid to cast ill omens over the campaign.  
Evoking Hermes, the herm statues delimited the threshold between public and private 
right throughout the Athenian agora.58 When their faces were damaged and beards ‘trimmed’, in 
the words of Thucydides,59 the desecration shook Athens to its very core – and became the point 
at which, to bastardise Streeck, ‘doping’ and (religious) ‘hoping’ were no longer matched by 
‘coping’. The act is sometimes described as one of debauched vandalism, but its scale – and the 
aggression of so clearly taking aim at the institutions of civil religion – suggested a carefully 
orchestrated threat to the stability of the city. Others interpret the act as a comment on the descent 
into folly of democracy, symptomatised in burnings of unpopular books60 and the growing 
hastiness, including on the part of Alcibiades, to ostracise opponents through shameless rabble-
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rousing. The docked beards, on this reading, testify to the infantile behaviour of the demos, with 
childlikeness identified at the time as a characteristic of the chronic drunk.61 A drunken escapade 
or not, suspicion of guilt over the mutilation fell on the same men: a pragmatic, albeit 
counterintuitive, combination of the opportunistic, attention-seeking, general and disillusioned, 
displaced and often ‘nihilistic’ heteratai, including the aforementioned Erixymachus and Phaedrus 
(also present in the Symposium). The latter were part of an organised aristocratic faction that 
preached maximal self-restraint and defined itself in opposition to the ‘undisciplined decadence’ 
of sympotic culture and the demos.62 Their dramatic intervention, perhaps, sought to shake 
Athens out of its disavowed stupor; to collapse the points of passage between the polis and 
anxiolytic retreat. The implication of Alcibiades, however, merely emphasises the futurelessness 
of the city’s foreshortened attention, narrowed to focus only on the next high. He embodied the 
appetitiveness that Socrates-Plato equated with tyranny and, four years later, after a period of 
exile and extensive collusion with Athens’s enemies, Sparta and Persia, he helped overthrow the 
demos in a bid to avoid trial. 
 
Mainlining the mainstream media 
 
From the trumping of third terms to prorogations of parliament, all set against an evidentially 
compelling backdrop of Russian interference in Western elections, the language of ‘coups’ has 
become more frequent of late. In the US and UK, at least, we are still, at the time of writing, yet 
to see the scale of violence that has typically preceded historical overthrows of democracy63 – 
but, in our general climate of acceleration, the fear is that it might not take long to make up the 
ground. One suggestion is that it is already here: we are ‘in a situation of quasi-war, albeit with 
very different forms of violence’ – economic, cyber and cultural warfare –, which have eroded the 
binary separation of war and peace that defined modern history.64 And ‘quasi-war’ is spreading 
because of technological disadjustment, to wit, the inability of social and political institutions dating 
from the age of the book to contain the extremes of feeling, the breakdown of trust, manufactured 
by digital consumerism. Writing in Nervous States: How Feeling Took Over the World, William 
Davis notes that the democracies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were made possible 
by phenomenotechnologies for the sharing of experience developed alongside the birth of 
capitalism. We can trace the ancient Athenian demos to the written language first adopted by 
Greek traders, and the same is broadly true of its Enlightenment re-emergence. The presumption 
of objectivity crucial to the growth of rational debate, and embodied in both the newspaper 
journalism and science of the era, originated in the use of double-entry accounting ledgers to 
present verifiable facts for scrutiny and analysis. ‘The ability of merchants to interact peacefully 
and reliably (often with complete strangers) was a testimony to the power of bookkeeping 
techniques’ to separate out important information from the character traits of its authors. Similar 
‘mechanisms for separating an argument from the persons making it were crucial’ to the creation 
of trust and authority in reporting, and to the acceptance of results produced by the experimental 
methods of science.65 Printed publications allowed for dispassionate reporting, creating the basis 
for consensus over a fabric of commensurable experience – a ‘common aisthesis’ in the language 
of Jacques Rancière66 – , around which to organise the coffee-house discussions of the emerging 
public sphere. Just as the direct democracy of Athens depended on oral-cultural norms being able 
to uphold the sobriety of debate, so the functioning of representative democracy depends on the 
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capacity of these institutions to expose arguments to the mediation of alternative perspectives 
and thereby ‘filter’, ‘frustrate’ and ‘correct’ the cognitive biases that ‘lead us to value immediate 
gratification over future benefits’. They are also supplemented, in this respect, by social 
technologies, including bicameral legislatures and independent judiciaries, intended to ‘have a 
“cooling” effect on popular passions’.67  
Insofar as they are ‘designed to be addictive’, to cultivate impulsivity,68 and make us 
‘sad’,69 the technologies of digital social media, by contrast, erode, rather than build, the bases of 
shared experience around which trust develops. It was in the context of using the nascent 
technologies of paper media to create a public that the rise of the novel became doubly 
dangerous. Writers from Cervantes to Laclos, Flaubert and beyond, both reassured and mocked 
the anxieties elicited by addicted readers’ withdrawal from public space and into the private zones 
of seductive romance fiction. But what was then the perceived exception of reading running 
counter to an aesthetic common ground, has since become the norm. One recent work on the 
‘attention industry’ traces the modern history of attention-capture to the 1830s, when, instead of 
using adverts to subsidise journalism, a new breed of press baron sensationalised and often 
outright fabricated content as a means to sell advertising. The pitching of stories at ‘the audience’s 
baser instincts’, at our ‘“automatic” as opposed to our “controlled” attention’,70 triggered a race to 
the bottom that has reached its apogee with digital technology’s multiplication of televisual and 
social media channels, which compete for an increasingly small share of advertising spoils while 
pitching to ever more fragmented customer bases. One result is that even truth, as Boris Groys 
has remarked, becomes an object of consumerist taste, deemed palatable to the extent that it 
validates our manufactured preferences.71 The process of attention-capture consists, on one 
hand, in the generation of anxiety, produced through the dramatisation employed to drown out 
competing sources of stimulus; and, on the other, in the common aisthesis giving way to the 
incommensurable worlds set in place by filter bubbles that tailor representation to fit with the 
profiles and biases of specific target audiences. In this double movement of dopamining, the 
creation of stressful, dislocating environments is coupled with the marketing of technological fixes, 
to be consumed without restraint as a means of perverse retreat from the chaos of the outside, 
‘real’, world. This leads, in turn, to our Balkanisation by algorithms engineered to keep newsfeeds 
free from the buzz-harshing encounters liable to disincentivise habitual returns to, and thereby 
counteract the narrowing of attention around, the object of consumption.  
Much like the gambling terminals analysed by Natasha Dow Schüll, these online safe 
spaces nonetheless make for decidedly ambiguous sanctuaries. One of the long-standing tropes 
of the vicious circularity of addiction is that the curative and toxic aspects of the pharmakon 
become increasingly inseparable in their intertwinement. Whatever the broader ecological causes 
of smoking, the addicted smoker ends up smoking more to combat the anxieties and withdrawal 
effects elicited by smoking. The same logic is at work in the encapsulating machine zones of the 
internet, where, from ‘climate porn’ to political collapse,72 we find therapy in gorging to the point 
of displeasure on the very stories that do most to raise our anxiety levels. It is along these lines 
that we should read a New York Times opinion piece, from May 2018, decrying liberals’ ‘Addiction 
to Trump’.73 Insatiable craving for news of the forty-sixth president’s latest scandals, the author 
argued, has seen his opponents retreat into echo chambers of self-indulgent jouissance, 
celebrating his monstrosity at the cost of short-circuiting politics, failing to deal with the broader 
consequences and policy issues of his election. It would be easy to dismiss the claim as a 
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politicised metaphor, not least because the diagnosis would presumably meet with the approval 
of Trump’s dreaded ‘core’. Like the resurgent Flat Earth movement, the latter vaunt themselves 
as super-scientific pursuers of truth beyond appearance, harnessing the disautomation and 
critical distance made possible by the internet to resist automation by the mainstream press. But 
their approbation need not invalidate an interpretation that is, anyhow, so easily politicised and 
intractably slippery (hence the clinical stress placed on self-diagnosis and the overturning of 
disavowal). And they, too, of course, readily present as Trump addicts – hooked, like their 
ineffectually teetotal messiah, on a diet of media that simultaneously manufactures and panders 
to the whims of addiction, by erasing the line between comforting illusion and the harshness of 
reality.  
 
Detox philosophy? 
 
It is no longer deemed the case that only some forms of (mainstreamed, mainlined) intoxicant are 
inherently addictogenic; that the safety of sobriety comes with avoiding a range of narrowly 
recognised threats. Plato saw the liberatory potential of writing, but only by also recognising that 
its liberation is inextricable from the diminishment of nonverbal communication and a 
corresponding weakening of trust. The abstract rules of written grammar, and the new techniques 
of thought to which writing gave rise, created a critical distance, loosening the hold of compulsion 
and disautomating the blind automation of oral memory. But writing can still, of course, be an 
object of pathological intoxication; a later (eighteenth and nineteenth-century) epidemic of 
addiction to novels will be additional proof of that.74 Likewise that other tool for the automation of 
mob impulses: Twitter. In a climate of more pervasive anxiety and psychosocial dislocation, 
caused, for instance, by the social fallout of technological change, and the exposure of the human 
sensorium to new forms of experience that further blur the boundary between truth and mere 
appearance, techniques of disautomation can leave us even more susceptible to the intoxicating, 
ecstasy-promising temptations of the machine zone.  
 The post-2016 boom in techno-demagoguery has elicited a scramble to develop methods 
for the detection and mitigation of fake news, from the enhanced Ai solutionism proposed by 
Facebook, to the kind of economy-of-contribution-style, participation-augmenting, methods for the 
collective certification of news sources that Stiegler would advocate. The latter, in particular, 
acknowledge the scale of the technological reorganisation of society hinted at by Plato, ‘the great 
heir of a still dominantly oral culture – in place by habit or preference, not technological necessity 
– and simultaneously its destroyer’.75 The philosopher’s position as a vector of recomposition in 
the midst of a society-wide technological phase-shift is reflected in Havelock, who saw Socratic 
Athens as the last stand of the oral, ‘poetic’ tradition; of an ‘acoustic technology of epic ... rendered 
obsolete by the technology of the written word’.76 The reflection is reinforced by his reading of 
Plato’s legendary antipathy towards poetry, exemplified in the banishing of poets from the ideal 
city of the Republic (394c-395a, 412e). The poet was emblematic of an outmoded pedagogical 
order: one where the use of pleasurable song and rhyme to wire laws into the brain was no longer 
stable enough to engender disciplined participation in the life of the city and, in the anxiety-
inducing world of the demos, had even become a ‘corruption of the mind’ (595b), a ‘kind of psychic 
poison’ that short-circuits reason and encourages withdrawal into zones of intoxication.77 The 
function of philosophy as disautomation, by contrast, was to readjust Athenian society around a 
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new technical-social order; to narrow the disadjustment between a technical system increasingly 
dominated by literacy and a social-political system of support that, still organised around the failing 
norms of oral culture, proved increasingly inadequate to the functioning of the polis. It was also to 
overturn psychosocial dislocation in the face of emerging automation anxiety and reintegrate 
citizens into the social and technical systems of their cultural environment, by reinventing 
education around the technology of writing. This is what Stiegler has termed penser/panser, or 
thinking as tending to wounds, where education serves as the instrument of readjustment.78 
Plato’s programme for it is most clearly visible in the Laws (c.347 BCE), which, reflecting the 
passage of time and the settling of the reformed demos around written culture, seems more at 
ease with the world of the alphabet than the residually oral-cultural Republic. His presumed final 
work certainly makes the connection between reorganising Athenian society around the 
challenges posed by writing and preventing the kind of institutional degradation that led to tyranny 
and the collapse of the demos at the end of the fifth century. Reflecting on the practical and 
moreover written laws that could be implemented to establish order in a proposed new Cretan 
colony, the Laws’ ‘Athenian stranger’, routinely agreed to be an avatar of Plato, laments the 
degeneration that ensues when law is encoded in ‘unwritten custom’, which is to say, in the 
constitutively mutable poems of oral culture, and overseen by the very people whose unruly habits 
it is supposed to keep in check (793b-c). He even sees in written laws, governing who could drink 
and sing what, where and when (670b-671d, 674a-c), the possibility of salvaging the debauched 
symposia from the ‘frenzied and excessive lust for pleasure’ that had left Athenians ‘in a kind of 
“voluntary slavery”’ (700a-d). Those laws will be underpinned, too, of course, by the cultivation of 
a rational, critical, philosophical disposition designed to strengthen the spirit against its 
enslavement by appetite. Its task is to coax us out of our machine zones, away from both the 
automation of the nervous system and the anxiety that leads us to take refuge in oblivion.  
In the digital age of Trump, and the aftermath of the disease model, the difference between 
the cold light of truth and the cave of illusion appears ever more evanescent, and even written 
law risks losing force against the fever dreams of the machine zone. If love and writing can be 
addictive, then we might similarly be wary of the temptation to use philosophy itself as a technique 
of therapeutic disavowal, employed to turn inwards, and away from the world it is charged with 
reinventing. Echoing what Alcibiades, in the Symposium, caricatured as ‘the madness, or Bacchic 
frenzy, of philosophy’ (τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίας τε καὶβακχείας, 218b), Vernant observes that the 
ambivalent space between the symposium and the polis, between anxiolytic withdrawal and a 
return to the public sphere, is where the so-called love of knowledge is born and perhaps forever 
remains.79 The observation, which serves as the point of departure for a follow-up to this article,80 
stands as a reminder that what readjusts in the aftermath of one technological revolution will only 
symptomatise and exacerbate the disadjustment of another. One might say that philosophy, too, 
will have to be disautomated, which is to say, forced to revisit habits and tendencies that, with 
hindsight, might reappear as self-indulgent and masturbatory withdrawal, dressed up as salvation. 
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